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UNIFICATION, FUNDING, DISCIPLINE
AND ADMINISTRATION: CORNERSTONES
FOR A NEW JUDICIAL ARTICLE
Luvern V. Rieke*
Witnesses appearing before the Judiciary Committee of the Wash-
ington Senate during the 1973 Session testified that the state's judicial
system, although not a "basket case," clearly needs renovation.1 This
would seem a fair appraisal, one in which the legislature eventually
concurred, at least in part.2 Measured in relative terms by common
criteria of chronological and geographical accessibility, the Wash-
ington courts score well. In absolute terms, there is ample room for
improvement.
Need for adjustments in the structure and operation of the judiciary
is occasioned by the same factors that require modification of other
institutions3 and is more accurately described as a continuing process
than as a response to a specific crisis.4 In recent years, however, de-
* Professor of Law, University of Washington; B.S., 1948, University of Washing-
ton, LL.B., 1949; LL.M., 1953, University of Chicago; LL.D., 1959, Pacific Lutheran
University.
1. Hearings on Substitute S.J. Res. 113 Before the Senate Judiciary Comm., 43d
Wash. Legis., 1st Ex. Sess., 1973. Statements were made by Ken Billington, Chairman,
Citizens' Conference on Washington Courts; Joe Davis, Executive Secretary, Wash-
ington State Labor Council; Charles I. Stone, President, Washington State Bar Associa-
tion; and Robert Utter, Justice, Washington Supreme Court.
2. H.R. Res. 121 (concurrent), 43d Wash. Legis., Ist Ex. Sess. (1973), acknowledges
the need for data concerning the structure, personnel, and functioning of the Judiciary
and directs the State Administrator for the Courts to initiate certain programs to correct
this deficiency in information.
3. Chief Justice Burger has, for example, called attention to the need "to apply the
techniques of modern business to the administration" of certain operations of the courts.
Burger, The State ofthe Judiciary--1970, 56 A.B.A.J. 929 (1970).
4. Roscoe Pound addressed the annual convention of the American Bar Association
on Aug. 26, 1906. His speech was entitled "The Causes of the Popular Dissatisfaction
with the Administration of Justice," and his opening sentence was: "Dissatisfaction with
the administration of justice is as old as law." 46 J. AM. JuD. Soc'Y 55 (1962). Contem-
porary work by such stalwarts as Tom Clark, former Associate Justice of the United
States Supreme Court, and Glenn Winters and Stanley Lowe of the American Judica-
ture Society lend credence to the celebrated dictum of Chief Justice Vanderbilt that"Ju-
dicial reform is not a sport for the shortwinded."
Paul C. Reardon, Associate Justice of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, has sug-
gested that even Vanderbilt and Pound were unhappy by the glacial speed of reform.
Reardon quotes Pound as saying, shortly before his death, that his 1906 address "was a
good speech, there has been a lot of talk about it, but nothing much has happened." He
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mands upon existing judicial resources have burgeoned, and it has
been said that the "old ways of doing things are clearly inadequate to
meet the burdens imposed on our courts by the 'law explosion' of the
mid-20th century.' 5 The legitimacy of these demands already has
been recognized in Washington. Partial reform of the courts of limited
jurisdiction was accomplished in 1961,6 and a court of appeals was
created in 1969.7 Since no one assumed those two steps alone would
resolve all the problems presented, Washington became an active par-
ticipant in the National Center for State Courts when it was organ-
ized.8 The state also has been aided twice by the citizen conference
series sponsored in part by the American Judicature Society. 9 It was
during the second of these two conferences that S.J.R. 113,10 the pro-
posal to place a new judicial article in the state constitution, was de-
veloped. The purpose of this article is to discuss some of the provi-
sions of that proposal.
For many persons, "judicial reform" has become virtually synony-
mous with "selection and tenure of judges."'1 However, there are other
issues, perhaps equally important. At least four such issues merit spe-
also suggests that Vanderbilt, if alive, might now say: "Please cease quoting me relative
to . . . the shortwinded and use the wind you save in action." Reardon, The New Na-
tional Center for State Courts-Progress and Prospects, 55 JUDICATURE 66 (1971).
5. 2 7TH AMERICAN ASSEMBLY, FINAL REPORT: THE COURTS, THE PUBLIC AND THE
LAW EXPLOSION (1965).
6. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 3.30.010-.090 (Supp. 1972). entitled "Justice Courts and
Other Inferior Courts- 1961 Act."
7. WASH. CONST. amend. 50. The implementing legislation was enacted in 1969.
WASH. REV. CODE ch. 2.06 (Supp. 1972), and the court began hearing cases on Sept. 8.
1969. See note 16 infra.
8. Judge Morell Sharp, U.S. District Court, while still a Justice of the Supreme
Court of Washington, was one of the six incorporators of the National Center. Judge
Sharp has been and still is a thoughtful contributor to the dialogue concerning judicial
reform.
9. The American Judicature Society was one of the joint sponsors of the Citizens'
Conference on Washington Courts, Seattle, Nov. 10-12, 1966, which provided impetus
for the Court of Appeals amendment, and of the Citizens' Conference on Washington
Courts 11, Issaquah, June 15-17. 1972.
10. S.J. Res. 113, 43d Wash. Legis., Reg. Sess. (1973) [hereinafter referred to as
S.J.R. 113].
11. Professor Maurice Rosenberg, for example, says that even in the best of courts,
"the key factor is still the judge .... Even in a government of laws, men make the de-
cisions." Rosenberg, The Qualities of Justices-Are They Strainable?, 44 TEX. L. REV.
1063 (1966). He cites Ehrlich, Freedom of Decision, in 9 MODERN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY
SERIES 65 (1917) for the proposition that "there is no guarantee ofjustice except the per-
sonality of the judge," and Leflar, The Quality of Judges, 35 IND. L.J. 289, 305 (1960)
for the statement: "The quality of our judges is the quality of our justice .... ." The
bibliography on the topic of judicial selection is extensive. Justice Robert Utter has
added a helpful evaluation of some of the possible variations in this issue of the Wash-
ington Law Review.
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cial attention and can be discussed in connection with specific provi-
sions of the proposal. The topics and the references in S.J.R. 113 are
as follows:
Section 1. "The judicial power.., shall be vested in a unified court
system .... "
Section 1(7). "The legislature shall provide for the funding of the
operation of the courts."
Section 14(2). "Any justice or judge may be suspended, removed,
or otherwise disciplined . .. .
Section 17. "The management and administration of the courts
shall be vested in the supreme court ... "
I. A UNIFIED COURT
Section 1(1) of the proposed judicial article is entitled "Unified
Court System." In its present form, the section provides for "an ad-
ministratively unified" court and designates the components of such
system.' 2 What would the adoption of such a constitutional provision
mean?
Article IV, section 1 of the Washington Constitution provides that
"The judicial power of the state shall be vested in a supreme court,
superior courts, justices of the peace, and such inferior courts as the
legislature may provide." The section was not intended to create a
unified court, and, as will soon be apparent, no such system exists.
As adopted in 1889, the Washington State Constitution provided
for a supreme court of five judges, and authorized the legislature to
increase the number of judges and to create departments. The mem-
bership was increased to seven in 1901 and to nine in 1909.13 The
legislature also authorized the court to sit in two departments, each
department consisting of four judges and the chief justice.14 The
12. As first introduced, section 1 of S.J.R. 113 was:
JUDICIAL SYSTEM. (1) Unified Court System. The judicial power of the state
shall be vested in a unified court system which shall be divided into one supreme
court, a court of appeals, a superior court, a district court, and other courts estab-
lished by statute. A single-level trial court embracing the superior court and the
district court may be provided by statute.
During the session, a substitute resolution was developed. In this form the phrase "a
unified court system" was expanded to "an administratively unified court system." The
amendment appears to have been an attempt to still the debate over the "single trial
court" issue. See note 30 and accompanying text infra.
13. WASH. REv. CODE § 2.04.070 (1959).
14. WASH. REV. CODE § 2.04.120 (1959).
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thirty-eighth amendment to the constitution, adopted in 1962, author-
ized the use of judges pro tempore.15 The same amendment author-
ized superior court judges to sit in any county of the state. When an-
other constitutional amendment was adopted in 1968 to create a court
of appeals, 16 some consideration was given to reducing the number of
supreme court judges, but no action was taken. Section 2(1) of the
current proposal would authorize a supreme court of "not less than
five nor more than nine [justices] as may be provided by statute."' 7
The supreme court originally had almost unlimited appellate juris-
diction and original jurisdiction for named writs. The establishment of
the court of appeals transferred the appellate load to that court, save
for five categories of cases which are to be directly appealed to the
supreme court. t8 The court of appeals has three divisions, the head-
quarters of which are in Seattle, Tacoma, and Spokane. Division I
(Seattle) has two panels; the other divisions have one panel each. The
panels are composed of three judges. For election purposes, the divi-
sions are divided into nine districts. Pursuant to Court of Appeals
Administrative Rule 8, the judge on each panel who has the shortest
term to serve and who does not hold office by appointment or by elec-
tion to fill a vacancy is chief judge. This rule is parallel to the consti-
15. Either retired judges or superior court judges could be used for this purpose.
16. WASH. CONST. art. 4 was amended by amendment 50. approved November 5.
1968. as follows:
Art. 4, § 30. COURT OF APPEALS. (1) Authorization. In addition to the courts
authorized in section I of this article, judicial power is vested in a court of appeals.
which shall be established by statute.
(2) Jurisdiction. The jurisdiction of the court of appeals shall be as provided by
statute or by rules authorized by statute.
(3) Review of superior court. Superior court actions may be reviewed by the
court of appeals or by the supreme court as provided by statute or by rule author-
ized by statute.
(4) Judges. The number, manner of election, compensation, terms of office, re-
moval and retirement of judges of the court of appeals shall be as provided by
statute.
(5) Administration and procedure. The administration and procedures of the
court of appeals shall be as provided by rules issued by the supreme court.
(6) Conflicts. The provisions of this section shall supersede any conflicting provi-
sions in prior sections of this article.
17. Adoption of this proposal would give the state a limitation on the nmaxinltlmn
number ofjudges for the first time. Perhaps concern over supreme court "packing" was
not a worry until the early decades of this century.
18. The implementing legislation defining jurisdictional boundaries is WASH. REV.
CODE § 2.06.030 (Supp. 1972). The issues going directly to the supreme court involve (1)
court orders directed to state officers; (2) alleged unconstitutionality of statutes or ordi-
nances; (3) death penalties; (4) "fundamental and urgent issues of broad public import";
and (5) conflicting decisions among the court of appeals panels or decisions of the su-
preme court.
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tutional provision presently governing selection of the chief justice of
the supreme court.19 The rule is designed, it would seem, to assist in the
re-election of the judge next to stand for election and, precisely by
virtue of that fact, almost guarantees that the chief judge will be un-
interested in experiments, innovations, or decisions which cause undue
public commotion.
The trial court of general jurisdiction 20 is the superior court. It is a
court of record2' with original jurisdiction in all cases in equity and in
nearly all cases in law. The superior court also has appellate jurisdic-
tion in a small number of instances, such as cases arising from courts
of limited jurisdiction.22 There are currently ninety-two superior court
judges who sit in twenty-eight judicial districts. Eighteen districts are
composed of a single county, nine districts cover two counties, and
one district is made up of three counties.
In addition to the supreme court, court of appeals, and the superior
court, the constitution provides for "justices of the peace and such
other inferior courts as the legislature may provide. ''23 The basic juris-
diction of justice courts is limited by the constitution, which author-
19. WASH. CONsT. art. IV, § 3 provides, in this connection, that:
The judge having the shortest term to serve not holding his office by appointment
or election to fill a vacancy, shall be the chiefjustice . . . and in case there shall
be two judges having in like manner the same short term, the other judges of the
supreme court shall determine which of them shall be chiefjustice.
20. The term "general jurisdiction" is used to distinguish these courts from those
which are designated as "courts of limited jurisdiction." The power of the latter courts is
limited in terms of issues, dollar value, and geographical area. Except for small criminal
and civil matters which may be handled by courts of limited jurisdiction, and the very
few cases in which the supreme court has original jurisdiction, the superior courts serve
as the trial courts for all proceedings.
21. The term "court of record" means that a record of the trial is preserved and an
appeal can be taken "on the record" without having witnesses appear to testify or other-
wise produce evidence. Where no record is kept, as is true of all courts of limited juris-
diction, review must be de novo-the entire matter must be tried as if the trial were
.new:
22. This review, if it may be properly so called, is the de novo trial described in note
21 suprt. It is often contended that "de novo" trials are unreasonably wasteful because
of the duplication required. To evaluate this contention one must at least know the cost
of making records at the trial level for all cases and the cost of hearing the cases which
are now heard de novo. Such data is not available. It is known that a notice of appeal is
entered in only 3.3 % of the cases actually tried (not the cases filed) by the district courts
and justices of the peace and in 4.7% of the cases tried by municipal courts. How many
of these notices of appeal are abandoned is not known. Informed persons estimate that
not more than 0.5% of the cases tried in courts of limited jurisdiction are in fact heard
on appeal. Some statistics bearing on this problem may be found in ADMINISTRATOR FOR
THE COURTS, 15TH ANNUAL REPORT, JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION IN THE COURTS, STATE OF
WASHINGTON 113, 139 (1971) [hereinafter cited as 1971 ADMINISTRATOR'S REPORT].
23. WASH. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
815
Unification
Washington Law Review
izes the legislature to establish the details governing the court's juris-
diction. A constitutional amendment in 195 124 prohibited "fee justices"
in cities of over 5,000 inhabitants. A further reduction in "fee" (unsal-
aried) justices occurred when the legislature enacted what is commonly
known as the Justice Court Act of 1961.25 Counties were not required
to conform to the 1961 act, and, as of 1973, eight counties have not
elected to do so. Accordingly, in those counties there are still judges
whose salary depends upon the fees collected. 26 By the perverse cus-
toms of labels, what the 1961 statutes call "justices of the peace"
commonly are known as "district court judges" who are organized
into what is known, almost incredibly, as the Magistrates' Association.
At last report there were sixty-two district courts, manned by
eighty-five district court judges, and an additional forty-six justices of
the peace in counties outside the 1961 act. Washington also has 235
municipal courts. 27
The jurisdiction of each of the courts of limited jurisdiction is de-
fined by statute28 and is too complex to justify description here. For
immediate purposes, it will suffice to state that the jurisdictions over-
lap and are haphazard. Prior to 1967, no one in Washington knew
precisely how many courts of limited jurisdiction were operating or
exactly what they were doing. A study financed by the legislature en-
abled the Administrator for the Courts to gather some data which re-
vealed that, excluding municipal courts, 300,000 matters were filed in
the courts of limited jurisdiction and nearly six million dollars in rev-
enue was generated in 1968-figures which increased to over a third
of a million filings and $7.3 million in revenue by 1971.29
24. WASH. CONST. amend. 28.
25. WASH. REV. CODE ch. 3.34 (Supp. 1972). The 1961 legislation requires that
judges of courts governed by the act be lawyers. However, in counties not under the act
and in municipal courts the judge need not be trained in the law. The 1971 Report of the
Administrator for the Courts, supra note 22, states that there are 140judges who are not
lawyers.
26. The United States Supreme Court has twice held that judicial officers paid from
fees they collect are not disinterested and that criminal convictions on cases heard by
such judges are not sustainable. Ward v. Village of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57 (1972).
and Tumey v. Ohio. 273 U.S. 510 (1927). Despite factual variations, these decisions
appear applicable to Washington fee judges.
27. 1971 ADMINISTRATOR'S REPORT at 21. In addition to the cities which have a
municipal court, there are fifty-eight municipalities which contract with district courts
for the enforcement of city ordinances.
28. WASH. REV. CODE tit. 3 (Supp. 1972).
29. 1971 ADMINISTRATOR'S REPORT at 113-14.
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As the foregoing description indicates, the primary characteristic of
the Washington judiciary is that it is not a unified system. Unfortun-
ately, as pointed out by a speaker at the Citizens' Conference on Courts,
"the unified court concept means different things to different people. '30
For many court reformers, the key aspect of unification is the single trial/
single appeal notion. The idea is that all trial courts should be courts of
record. An appeal would be on the record, not de novo, and would
move directly to the court of appeals or supreme court. For practical
purposes, courts of limited jurisdiction would be merged with the su-
perior court. This concept has been vigorously discussed in Wash-
ington for some years by friends3' and foes. 32 It is important to under-
stand that a unified court system may or may not have a single
trial/single appeal provision. S.J.R. 113 skirts the issue by providing,
in section 1(1), that: "A single-level trial court embracing the superior
court and the district court may be provided by statute for the entire
state or a region therein. 33 This is a noble attempt to avoid "grasping
the nettles." One is reminded that "the paradox of judicial reform lies
in the contrast of its major promise, to remove politics from the
courts, and the road to its achievement, political compromise. 34
Attitudes concerning the "single trial court problem" color nearly
every discussion. It is especially interesting to notice that citizen groups
strongly favor the single trial/single appeal concept.3 5
For analytical purposes, an attempt should be made to separate
the "unified court" and "single trial court" issues. The concept of unifi-
cation is a much broader problem. It is central to important considera-
tions of administration and management, funding, discipline and
30. Address by Professor Rubin G. Cohn, Court Organization and Administration,
Washington Citizens' Conference, June 16, 1972. Professor Cohn says that to him a
unified court "means essentially a simplified court structure, functionally integrated and
interrelated in each of its parts, over which there exists an effective centralized admin-
istrative authority."
31. Truax, Courts of LimitedJurisdiction are Pass, 53 JUDICATURE 326 (1970).
32. Sharp, A Unified Trial Court?, 24 WASH. ST. BAR NEWS 13 (No. 5, 1970).
33. As originally written the sentence ended with the word "statute." The con-
cluding phrase, added in the substitute resolution, appears of little value, may be need-
lessly ambiguous, and must represent some political tactic.
34. B. COOK, THE PARADOX OF JUDICIAL REFORM: THE KANSAS EXPERIENCE (Amer-
ican Judicature Society Report No. 29, 1970).
35. Citizens' Comm. on Washington Courts, Conference Summary, point 3, June
17, 1972; Billington, Our Courts are Good and Should Be Better: A Non-Lawyer's
View, 26 WASH. ST. BAR NEWS 10 (No. 8, 1972); Citizens' Study Comm. on Judicial
Organization, Madison, Wisconsin 73 (1972).
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tenure of judges, and utilization of judicial manpower. A number of
earnest but not notably successful attempts have been made to intro-
duce order into the Washington judicial system by administrative
efforts. The supreme court, for example, does have rule-making power
and has used it to achieve some procedural uniformity,36 but the superior
courts constitutionally are empowered to govern themselves by their
own rules.37 Rules have been promulgated for the supervision of courts
of limited jurisdiction, but the means to implement such rules is lack-
ing. Regularity and continuity have been sought through the organ-
ization of judicial conferences. 38 Although the problem of disunity has
been recognized and attempts have been made to deal with it, no
manageable system has emerged. A manageable system seems essen-
tial to judicial reform. Thus, in a sense, unification is a condition prece-
dent to the other issues involved in S.J.R. 113.
II. FUNDING THE COURTS
Section 1(7) of S.J.R. 113 proposes that "the legislature shall
provide for the funding of the operations of the courts." What are the
implications of this proposal?
Historically the government has not borne the costs of private liti-
gation, at least not beyond providing a building and sometimes a sala-
ried judge.39 Despite an annoying tendency to match a raise in judicial
36. The supreme court, with the assistance of the Judicial Council, has been diligent
in amending and supplementing practice rules. Civil Rules for the Superior Court were
adopted in 1967. Rules of Criminal Procedure were adopted in 1973, and Rules for
Appeal are now being developed. The legislature authorized the supreme court to issue
rules governing courts of limited jurisdiction in 1925, WASH. REV. CODE § 2.04.190
(1959). and in 1961, WASH. REV. CODE § 3.30.080 (Supp. 1972). In 1963 the Rules for
Courts of Limited Jurisdiction (divided into administration, civil, criminal, and traffic
rules) were issued and distributed to each court of limited jurisdiction. The rule-making
power has helped, but structural and organizational reform cannot be accomplished by
this process alone.
37. WASH. CONST. art. IV, § 24.
38. WASH. REV. CODE § 2.56.060 (Supp. 1972), part of the legislation creating the
office of Administrator for the Courts, authorizes an annual conference of judges. These
conferences are attended by the judges of the appellate and the superior courts. The
meeting is normally held at the same time and in the same locality as the annual Wash-
ington State Bar Association meeting. WASH. REV. CODE ch. 2.16 (Supp. 1972) provides
for an assocication of superior court judges. These judges are organized and hold annual
meetings. WASH. REV. CODE ch. 3.70 (Supp. 1972), enacted in 1961, along with the Jus-
tice Court Act, establishes a State Magistrates' Association which also meets annually.
Note that no one of these groups includes the whole judiciary.
39. Comment, Kansas Court Costs: The Quality of Mercy is Strained, 9 WASHBURN
L.J. 8(1969).
818
Vol. 48: 811, 1973
Proposed Judicial Article:
salaries with an increase in filing fees and to pay for law library costs
out of charges imposed upon litigants, there probably has been a
gradual trend toward paying a greater percentage of the total justice
system expenses with public funds. Whether such a trend actually is
occurring or not, it would seem proper to support the judiciary almost
totally with tax funds-more specifically, with- state funds, since we
regard our judicial system, except for the municipal courts, as a part
of our state system of government. Somewhat strangely, however, we
have not put the financial burden of the judiciary at the state level as
we have the other two equal branches of government-the executive
and legislative. Is there any more reason for a judge of the superior
court to receive half his salary from county funds than for a legislator
or an official of the executive branch to be so compensated? The issue is
more than a philosophical one for the simple reason that no form of
management is more effective than that based upon control of the
budget.
In a Conference Summary issued by the Citizens' Committee on
Washington Courts, it is stated that a "most significant need is to
provide adequate appropriated funds for the operation of the entire
judicial system from state rather than local government sources."40
May one assume that the above quoted language of S.J.R. 113 was
intended to require financing of the judicial system from state funds?
This would be a major shift in Washington, for state funding of the
courts clearly has not been our pattern. Money appropriated by the
state legislature presently pays only the salaries of the appellate court
judges, half the salary of the superior court judges, and a few other
expenses. 41 The balance of funds used to finance the courts and court
related activities comes from county and municipal allocations.
All of the truisms relating to "control of the purse strings" apply to
courts in the same manner as they do to other activities. An inde-
pendent judiciary, free of political influence, is not helped when
40. Citizens' Comm. on Washington Courts; 1972 Conference Summary, point 5,
at 3.
41. Judicial agencies for which the legislature appropriates money are the supreme
court, court of appeals, state law library, office of the Administrator for the Courts, and
Judicial Council. State funds also are appropriated to pay one-half the salaries of supe-
rior court judges (plus benefits) and for the state contribution to the judicial retirement
funds. Total appropriations for the judiciary for the 1973-75 biennium are $9,949,503
(Ch. 137 [1973] Wash. Laws, 1st Ex. Sess.). In addition the state pays about one-tenth
of the cost of adult and juvenile probation services. The total paid by the state in 1971
was $1,369,098.
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judges must appear hat-in-hand before county commissioners. The
judge's position is awkward enough simply because he must stand for
election in the county, and the fact that some of the commissioners
may be litigants before the judge increases the ethical problem. Indeed,
when one recognizes that a lawyer-commissioner may hear the judge's
request for funds one day and argue before the judge the next, it is
difficult to avoid characterizing the situation as a conflict of interests.
Fortunately, since most judicial salaries are established at statewide
levels (except for municipal judges and unsalaried justices of the peace
concerning whom more will be said later), most judges are spared the
need to lobby that question before local boards. 42 The same happy
circumstance does not pertain to appropriations for facilities and staff.
Some variation in local funding is inescapable, and perhaps this alone
is not greatly detrimental. The greater danger lies in the probability
that local funds will not be adequate. While counties obtain money
principally from property taxes-a regressive and undesirable method
at best-and have nearly reached the limits of that avenue of income,
the cost of judicial operation continues to increase. 43 The resulting
squeeze for dollars and the importance of funding other local services
such as schools stimulate demands for the courts to pay their own
way. The consequence of such fiscal pressure is the development of a
new "fee justice" system of courts.44 District and municipal courts are
42. The salary of superior court judges and full-time justice court judges are fixed
by statute and are uniform throughout the state. Ch. 137 [1973] Wash. Laws, 1st Ex.
Sess., set the salary for superior court judges at $32,000, justice court judges in counties
governed by the 1961 Justice Court Act, at $26,000, and justice court judges in counties
not under the 1961 act, at $18,000. The legislature sets a range for the salaries of
part-time judges of courts of limited jurisdiction. (See WASH. REV. CODE §§ 3.16.002,
3.58.020, 35.20.160, 35.22.420, 35.23.220, 35.24.450, and 35.27.520 (1959)). The county
commissioners, city council, or mayor choose the salary within the range to be paid to
the judge. In 197 1, of 115 part-time judges surveyed, six were paid out of fees and the
rest received salaries ranging from $120 to $13,000 per year. The median salary was
$1800 per year, and the average (not including those paid out of fees) was $2681.46.
WJC STUDY.
43. Expenditures for justice courts (excluding municipal courts) increased 34% from
1969 to 197 1. WASH. LEGIS. TRANSP. COMM. ALTERNATIVE COMPUTATIONS FOR DETER-
MINING THE FISCAL IMPACT OF HB 645 on JUSTICE COURT REVENUES (1971).
44. While costs were rising, revenue from the justice courts was dropping. Revenue
decreased 12% in the years 1969-1971. Despite this "adverse" shift, there was each year
some net percentage of court revenue remaining after expenses were deducted. This
"profit" is distributed in proportions prescribed by statute to state, county, and city
funds. Amounts available for such distribution were 3.44 million dollars in 1969, 2.81
million in 1970, and 1.45 million in 1971. This is a 58% reduction in net revenue
during the three years. Id.
820
Vol. 48: 811, 1973
Proposed Judicial Article: Funding
expected to pay their way, 45 and it seems likely that in some commun-
ities court revenue is looked to as a significant source of income.46
Pressure to obtain so-called bail forfeitures in traffic cases and to se-
cure convictions which produce fines in other cases is inevitable.
Judges sometimes receive worried messages from county fiscal per-
sonnel when receipts sag,47 and planners are pressed for recommenda-
tions to generate more revenue through the courts.48 Impact upon the
quality of justice is unavoidable. 49 The practices here described pose
the question of whether one may distinguish valid revenue generation
from an unconstitutional form of tax gathering.50 Justice, after all, is
not supposed to be for sale.
Regrettably, Washington has not yet freed itself from fee justices in
the traditional sense.51 Unsalaried justices of the peace are recognized
by our state constitution. Article IV, section 13 prohibits the receipt of
45. The following statement appears in KING COUNTY AUDITOR, REVIEW OF
DISTRICT JUSTICE COURT OPERATIONS 7 (April 19, 1971):
Of fundamental concern to the county is the recovery of the full cost of operating
the District Justice Court system. One disadvantage of the present system is that
the operation of the district courts can be used as a county-subsidized legal facility
for cities in the county.... A second weakness of the present system is the inability
to recover other than direct budget expenditures from the Justice Court Expense
Fund.
46. The WJC STUDY surveyed 151 municipal and justice (including justice of the
peace) courts for 1971 expenses. Comparing expenses to income (including traffic pen-
alties) shown in the 1971 Report of the Administrator for the Courts, it appears that
only nine of these courts had expenses greater than income. The rest produced a sur-
plus of income ranging from a few dollars over expenses to $465,000 more than expenses.
47. Correspondence on file in author's office, University of Washington School of
Law.
48. A 1972 study of the Seattle District Court states that: "If all the recommenda-
tions are implemented, the Seattle Court can operate on a 'break-even' basis, rather than
at its anticipated annual deficit of $100,000." The first recommendation is: "Request the
legislature to increase the basic civil filing fee from $6.00 to $14.00, and charge an addi-
tional fee of $10.00 for garnishment actions. Also increase the small claims filing fee
from $1.00 to $5.00." SEATTLE DIST. CT. KING Co. WASH., A MANAGEMENT AUDIT BY
THE OFFICE OF COUNTY AUDITOR (May 12, 1972).
49. By ch. 10 [1973] Wash. Laws, Ist Ex. Sess., the legislature authorized coun-
ties to deduct the cost of providing counsel for indigent defendants from the justice
court current expense fund. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972), held that, absent
waiver, a defendant could not be imprisoned for a misdemeanor or other petty offense
unless represented by counsel. The fiscal impact of that decision has not yet been deter-
mined. It remains to be seen what share ofiustice court revenue will be required for this
purpose.
50. See Saari, Open Doors to Justice-An Overview of Financing Justice in Amer-
ica, 50 JUDICATURE 296 (1967). Saari discusses cases which have held some court fees
invalid, id. at 297.
51. The WJC STUDY discovered six fee justices among 115 justices interviewed. See
note 42 supra.
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fees "to his own use" by judicial officers except unsalaried justices of
the peace. The 1961 Justice Court Act provides for salaries, but, as
noted earlier, not all counties have been brought under that act. It
seems certain that the decisions of such fee justices could be over-
turned, 52 but for most litigants the expense of such constitutional vindi-
cation would make the victory Pyrrhic.
This disorganized and undesirable method of funding courts cannot
continue. Difficulties are by no means limited to obtaining allocations
for the operation of the courts: the inherent difficulty of transmitting
and accounting for funds collected under the existing scattered opera-
tion poses equally burdensome problems. 53 At least one study indi-
cates that this source of funding may soon be inadequate in any event.54
In addition, reliance upon local funding to maintain Washington's
judicial system may require some localities to pay a disproportionately
high share of the total costs of the court system. For example, the
presence of a penal institution in a county will produce an abnormally
large volume of writs for the superior court to hear. The current pat-
tern of funding also requires Thurston County,55 site of the state capi-
tol, to pay the costs related to litigation involving claims against state
officers and kindred matters. Further, the financial burden of do-
mestic relations cases is borne largely by the urban trial courts to which
such cases are often moved from rural courts. Complaints received by
52. See note 26 sutpra.
53. King County v. United Pac. Ins. Co., 72 Wn. 2d 604, 434 P.2d 554 (1967) in-
volved a shortage between revenue received by a district court and the amount trans-
mitted by the court to the county. The supreme court decided that the judge could be held
personally accountable whether the shortage resulted from his own acts or the acts of the
clerks and deputies working under his supervision. The decision has obvious implica-
tions for judges and their bonding companies. It has been argued that many lawyers oth-
erwise willing to serve as justices will be deterred from such service by the economic
risk imposed. Study of this problem by the Judicial Council resulted in proposed legisla-
tion to provide some protection for the judge. The bill (H.B. 425) was not enacted
during the 1973 regular and first extraordinary session. Embezzlement remains a possi-
bility under any system, but the situation can be improved. Fines, fees, alimony, sup-
port payments and other monies which come into the court are far too extensive to be
handled as if they were small change in the sugar bowl. A unified court system would
bring some order to this fiscal function in Washington as it has done in other states. For a
description of a state system which is said to work well, see the section entitled Fiscal
Management in CHIEF JUSTICE OF THE COLORADO SUPREME COURT, ANNUAL REPORT,
THE STATE OF THE COURTS 3 (1972).
54. See ALTERNATIVE COMPUTATIONS FOR DETERMINING THE FISCAL IMPACT
OF HB 645 ON JUSTICE COURT REVENUES, supra note 43.
55. But see ch. 44 [1973] Wash. Sess. Laws, anending WASH. REV. CODE §
4.92.010 (Supp. 1972). The statute as amended allows any plaintiff to sue the state or a-
state official in any county according to the normal rules governing venue.
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the Judicial Council indicate that numerous venue changes result in
shifting costs from a county of residence to another county which has-
no special relation to the parties or to the litigation.56 Changes in
venue for lengthy and expensive litigation, such as that involved in
State v. O'Connell,57 impose an impossible financial load on a small
county and require the appellate court to be imaginative beyond rea-
sonable expection in fashioning relief.
State funding is a rather obvious solution to most of these difficul-
ties, and, as stated earlier, the Citizens' Conference Report favored
such central funding. However, if section 1(7) was intended to require
that result, it was not so understood by the legislature. In fact, con-
cern was expressed in senate hearings that the clause might be so in-
terpreted, and the Judiciary Committee proposed an amendment
which would require only that the legislature "provide the method of
funding the operations of the courts."58 There are a few jurisdictions
in which court funding is done totally, or almost totally, at the state
level, and a trend in that direction appears to be underway.59 Never-
theless, it would be impractical to expect an abrupt change from one
funding system to the other. Wisconsin is considering what could well
be an appropriate transitional process. A citizens' report in that state
recommended: "State assumption of . . . financing . . . on a
gradual basis over a period of years [beginning with] . . . judicial
or support employees salaries, . . . to supplies and services, and
finally . . . for courtroom facilities. ' 60
56. WJC STuDY. During 1972 an attempt was made by the Administrator for the
Courts and by the Judicial Council staff to obtain data showing what costs are imposed
upon counties to which cases are transferred. It was learned that records are not kept
which disclose such information, but several counties assert that the amount is substan-
tial. A Judicial Council committee has been instructed to gather the best information
available and to develop legislation responsive to whatever need can be identified.
57. State v. O'Connell is an order of the supreme court, No. 42041, dated October
1, 1971. Because it is only an order, not a decision, it does not appear in the Reports.
The problem before the court was how to protect Clark County from the "extreme
financial hardship" caused by change of venue from King County. Five justices de-
cided that there were "no statutes directly in point" and that the court had inherent
power to allocate costs. Four justices, dissenting, felt that the state constitution and
relevant legislation forbade such allocation.
58. Hearings on Substitute S.J. Res. 113 Before the Senate Judiciary Comm., 43d
Wash. Legis., Ist Ex. Sess., 1973.
59. ADVISORY COMM. ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS REPORT, STATE-LOCAL
RELATIONS IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM (1971).
60. Citizens' Study Comm. on Judicial Organization, supra note 35.
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For the reasons mentioned above, it seems predictable that state
financing of the judiciary will not be long delayed. It is thought and
has been held that courts have inherent power to compel state and
local governments to furnish funds reasonably necessary for court
functions. 61 Such an application of judicial power may be proper in
an extreme case but, as Justice Brennan has pointed out, is also "to a
certain extent illusory for, ultimately, sovereignty is not divisible. 62
The more challenging question is how to do the job well. Who will
develop the budget? How will it be presented and justified? Will the
executive have power of review? Who will interpret fiscal needs to the
legislature? These questions will be deferred until the discussion of
management and administration.
III. JUDICIAL DISCIPLINE AND REMOVAL
While this paper was being written the newspapers reported that
"The State Superior Court Judges today unanimously approved a
Code of Judicial Conduct aimed at policing themselves before
someone else decides to do it."' 63 The action of the judges had been
heralded by their legislative spokesman. 64 The interest of the judges in
the issue of judicial discipline was neither new nor entirely sponta-
neous, as members of the Bar and of the public had been calling for
change for several years. During 1972 some lawyers urged that the
essentially benign lawyers' preference poll, a sort of guide to voters
concerning judicial performance, should be transformed into a
full-blown evaluation of judges. Nearly half of the lawyers in the state
returned a questionnaire and expressed opinions about the issue of
judicial performance and discipline. Some results were made public.65
61. Commonwealth ex rel. Carroll v. Tate, 442 Pa. 45, 274 A.2d 193 (1971). See
Carrigan, Inherent Powers and Finance, 7 TRIAL 22 (No. 6, 1971).
62. Brennan, Judicial Fiscal Independence, 23 U. FLA. L. REV. 277, 281 (197 1).
63. Seattle Times, Apr. 20, 1973, § A, at 7.
64. Judge William L. Brown, appearing before Senate Judiciary Committee on
S.J.R. 113 on March 21, 1973, mentioned a voluntary disciplinary proposal under con-
sideration by the Superior Court Judges' Association. The adoption culminated work
begun in 1969, described in a two-part article, Judicial Ethics, 24 WASH. ST. BAR NEWS
7 (No. 2, 1970) and 24 WASH. ST. BAR NEWS 7 (No. 3, 1970).
65. WSBA Board Disseninates Data on Rating of Judges, 26 WASH. ST. BAR NEWS
16 (No. 3. 1972). It had been decided earlier that the poll was "not intended as a polit-
ical or punitive measure for general public release." 25 WASH. ST. BAR NEWS 13 (No.
I1, 1971).
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When asked if they were satisfied with the "present system of judicial
discipline," sixty-five percent of the lawyers replied no. Some made
comments such as "What present system?" and "I didn't know there
was a present system." Clearly it is time for action.
Peer review must not be underestimated as a method of judicial
control. Nor should its efficacy be overestimated, especially in the ab-
sence of a unified court system. Judges who answer only to an elector-
ate have little reason to correct each other's shortcomings. A code of
ethics is commendable, but, as put editorially a few years ago, the
public "expects far more than it has received thus far in the judges'
own attempts at self-regulation. '66
Although the disciplining of judges is a difficult and sensitive mat-
ter, Washington has available only the standard, traditional processes.
The existing Canons of Judicial Ethics 67 are regarded by many as little
more than pious platitudes. The constitution does provide that "the
legislature may by general law . . . require the retirement of judges
for physical or mental disability, or any cause rendering judges incap-
able of performing their judicial duties. ' 68 It also provides for re-
moval of a "judge of any court of record" for reason of "incompe-
tency, corruption, malfeasance, or delinquency in office, or other suf-
ficient cause," but only by a joint resolution of the legislature in which
three-fourths of the members concur.6 9 One is hardly over-taxed to
show that this mixture of sanctionless exhortation, largely unexercised
statutory retirement power for incapacity, and impossibly cumber-
some removal authority for malfeasance is unsatisfactory. For exam-
ple, removal of a judge by three-quarters vote of the legislature is, in
the words of Jack E. Frankel, "almost fanciful. '70 Even if legislative
attention could be attracted to such an undertaking, the process is too
long, too difficult, and much too political. 71
66. Editorial, Seattle Times, Dec. 9, 1969.
67. WASH. R. GEN. APPLIC., CANONS OF JUDICIAL ETHICS 1-36.
68. WASH. CONST. art. IV, § 3(a). At present, a judge also may voluntarily retire if
"physically or otherwise permanently incapacitated for the full and efficient perform-
ance of the duties of his office," if he has served for ten years and can prove the inca-
pacity. WASH. REV. CODE § 2.12.020 (Supp. 1972). Obviously this is not the same as
being removed.
69. WASH. CONST. art. IV, § 9.
70. Frankel, Judicial Discipline and Removal, 44 TEx. L. REV. 1117, 1119 (1966).
Mr. Frankel is executive secretary of the Commission on Judicial Qualifications of the
State of California.
71. For an interesting account of a famous case, see Blackmar, On the Removal of
Judges: The Impeachment Trial of Samuel Chase, 48 JUDICATURE 183 (1965).
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Nor is it easy to select a disciplinary system which is fair to the
judge. He is not in a position to defend himself by public debate and,
if charged with impropriety or incompetence at the time of an elec-
tion, he can be harmed in a way which may be quite unwarranted.
For reasons such as this, it is often suggested that discipline should be
administered within the judiciary.72 The dangers are real enough so
that any meaningful disciplinary system probably cannot be imple-
mented without court unification and changes in the judicial selection
process. 73 Available processes do not fit the usual discipline case in
which more than a reprimand for unethical conduct but less than
removal from the system is indicated. To offer only Canons of Ethics
or mandatory retirement is to misunderstand the nature of the
problem.74
There are, of course, other possibilities for discipline. It is pro-
vided by statute that judges of courts which are not courts of record
and therefore not within the constitutional provision mentioned above
forfeit their office by commission of a felony.75 This statutory forfei-
ture was asserted in the case of State ex rel. Carroll v. Simmons,76 in
which Judge Simmons was convicted of a felony by the superior court
but, by obtaining a reversal of the felony conviction, avoided forfei-
ture of his office. In the process, however, he demonstrated that dis-
barment is another way in which a judge of a court not of record can
lose his office. 77 However, disbarment poses no threat to justices of
the peace who need not be lawyers to hold office;78 and even if the
threat of felony conviction and disbarment reached all judges, the
process would be unduly disruptive. Judge Simmons made this point
72. See Frankel, Judicial Discipline and Removal, 44 TEx. L. REv. 1117, 1120 n.6
(1966), citing Kales, Methods of Selecting and Retiring Judges, I I J. Am. JUD. Soc'Y
113 (1928), and Simpson, Federal Impeachment, 64 U. PA. L. REV. 651, 803 (1916).
73. See Cook, The Politics of Piecemeal Reform of Kansas Courts, 53 JUDICATURE
274 (1970). "Judges are unlikely to accept surveillance and insecurity without the bene-
fits of tenure and the esprit de corps of a single unified court." Id. at 280.
74. The National Conference on Judicial Selection & Court Administration, 43 J.
AM. JUD. Soc'Y 114 (1959):
The most urgent need is for methods to deal with judicial conduct of a nature not
warranting or requiring removal. ...
Provision should be made for the initiation and investigation of complaints be-
fore presentment of formal charges, and precaution should be taken for the protec-
tion of all persons involved.
75. WASH. REv. CODE § 9.92,120 (1959).
76. 61 Wn. 2d 146, 377 P.2d 421 (1962).
77. In re Simmons, 65 Wn. 2d 88, 395 P.2d 1013 (1964).
78. See note 25 supra.
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by dismissing cases for want of prosecution after his records and cler-
ical support were removed and the corporation counsel declined to
appear before him, while the city struggled with writs of quo war-
ranto, bench warrants and temporary injunctions. Even then the case
lacked the drama which some disciplinary proceedings have had. The
infamous 1962 "warrant war" in California, for example, featured two
justices who issued nearly fifty warrants of arrests against public offi-
cials before they finally were suspended from office.79
The Washington Court of Appeals recently reversed and remanded
a criminal conviction because circumstances created the appearance
that the trial judge might have an interest in the matter, commenting
that: "The appearance of bias or prejudice can be as damaging to
public confidence . . . as would be the actual presence of bias or
prejudice."8 0 Yet when the headlines of a local paper flatly charge a
judge with conflict of interest,81 or when a judge is accused of racial
bias and physical abuse of a petitioner,82 no process exists to rehabili-
tate public confidence by either vindicating the judge if he has been
maligned, or taking appropriate action if he has been properly ac-
cused.
Section 14(2) of S.J.R. 113 would apply to all of these problems.
The subsection provides:
79. In re Tindall, 60 Cal. 2d 469,386 P.2d 473 (1963).
80. State v. Mandry, 8 Wn. App. 61, 504 P-2d 1156 (1972). It may be argued that
reversal of a criminal conviction for "appearance" ofjudicial bias is a rather expensive
method of protecting the judicial image, assuming incontrovertible proof of the defend-
ants guilt existed. Even worse, one wonders if such reversals have any corrective effect
upon questionable judicial conduct. In the case of Podlaskey v. Price, 87 Cal. App. 2d
151, 168, 196 P.2d 608, 618 (1948), the court reversed a decision for improper conduct
of ajudge and observed that: "Similar behavior by Judge Burnell has been the subject of
many reversals during the past 24 years . . . without effecting a reform in his
behavior . . . A concurring opinion suggested that the judge might be found men-
tally incompetent or be removed by "a concurrent resolution of both Houses of the Leg-
islature adopted by a two-thirds vote of each House." California now has a disciplinary
process capable of preventing such a "public scandal," but Washington is today almost
exactly where California was in 1948.
81. Conflict of Interest? Hamilton sits as judge over long-time client. Headlines,
Wenatchee Daily World, Jan. 7, 1973, at 1. The news account asserted that the judge
was "not only a long-time friend and former neighbor . . . but also had been [the de-
fendant's ] attorney on other cases in different courts over the past nearly 20 years."
82. A Chicano woman alleged that she asked a non-lawyer justice of the peace for
assistance in stopping other persons from harassing her and that the justice replied with
racially-oriented comment and by shoving or kicking her off a porch. These allegations,
after investigation by the State Board Against Discrimination, were reported to the At-
torney General, supreme court, Judicial Council and Magistrates' Association. The
general conclusion reached apparently was that none of these agencies had authority to
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Any justice or judge may be suspended, removed, or otherwise disci-
plined by the Judicial Qualification and Districting Commission for
misconduct in office which may be defined by statute or by rule au-
thorized by statute, or for wilful and persistent failure to perform his
duties.
"Procedures would be established," said the chairman of the Citizens'
Committee on Washington Courts in writing about the proposed
Commission, "whereby judges who were neglectful of their responsi-
bilities, either from personal habit or direct disregard, could be disci-
plined or removed."8 3 The virtues claimed for a disciplinary system
administered by a commission are its universality, capacity for prompt
action, and the opportunity to tailor the response to the need of each
case.
Creation of a disciplinary commission would not constitute rash or
pioneering action. Over a decade of well documented experience is
available in the reports of other states.84 The model for such commis-
sions, used now in approximately half the states, is that of California.
The annual reports of that commission indicate a modest but steady
flow of activity. A chart most conveniently illustrates the experience of
the two most recent years: 85
TOTAL NO. COMPLAINTS CASES INVESTIGATED CONTACT OF J UDGE
YEAR OF JUDGES FILED IN DETAIL BY COMMISSION
1971 1087 217 54 42
1972 1115 213 64 49
It will be observed that most complaints are resolved without detailed
investigation. When detailed investigation indicated reason to do so,
communication with the judge was undertaken. By this process the
difficulty was disclosed and either satisfactorily explained or alleviated
by suggestions for improvement and correction of judicial conduct, In
intervene. Procedure for Complaints Against Judges of Courts of Limited Jurisdiction,
Judicial Council Docket 67-4-6.
83. Billington, Our Courts Are Good and Should Be Better: A Non-Lawyer's View,
26 WASH. ST. BAR NEWS 10 (No. 8, 1972).
84. An extensive bibliography, available in pamphlet form, entitled PUBLICATIONS
AVAILABLE FROM THE AMERICAN JUDICATURE SOCIETY (1972), lists a number of reports
concerning disciplinary commissions for anyone interested in details.
85. 1971 AND 1972 REPORT OF THE [CALIF.] COMMISSION ON JUDICIAL QUALIFICA-
TIONS TO THE GOVERNOR. Obtained from Jack E. Frankel, Executive Officer of the
Commission.
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each of the years mentioned two judges retired voluntarily while the
investigation was in progress. In only one instance was a formal
hearing completed. That case resulted in a recommendation that the
supreme court remove the judge from office.
Colorado also has a Judicial Qualifications Commission.8 6 From
April 1967 to March 1973 the commission met thirty-two times, re-
ceived eighty-seven complaints, dismissed about half that number as
frivolous, and investigated the remainder. Its activities since 1967
have resulted in the retirement or resignation of nine judges and
public censure of another nine.87 More significant than the removals
and censure actions, however, is the fact that the system works well
with minimum notoriety. The Colorado Report states that:88
Usually, an informal hearing followed by letter from the Commission
is sufficient to eliminate the judicial behavior complained of or to have
a judge resign or retire voluntarily without requiring a formal hearing
and subsequent review by the Supreme Court.
Nothing indicates that Washington has an unusual problem in
maintaining a good judiciary. Indeed the contrary can be asserted
with reason.8 9 Still problems have and will arise, and when two-thirds
of the lawyers responding to a survey are unsatisfied with judicial dis-
cipline and eighty percent of those unsatisfied believe a discipline
commission is desirable, the proposal merits attention.90
IV. MANAGEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF THE
COURTS
Any system, judicial or otherwise, needs management and adminis-
tration. Yet, because of an assortment of historical reasons and be-
cause of a fear of loss of independence, judges have resisted being
"administered." It is said that:91
86. COLO. CONST. art. VI, § 23(3).
87. ANNUAL REPORT OF THE CHIEF JUSTICE OF THE COLORADO SUPREME COURT, THE
STATE OF THE COURTS 17 (1972).
88. Id.
89. Billington, supra note 83.
90. 26 WASH. ST. BAR NEWS 16 (No. 3, 1972), supra note 65.
91. Address by Lester Cingcade, Non-Judicial Personnel and Court Financing,
Citizens' Conference on Washington Courts, June 16, 1972.
829
Discipline
Washington Law Review
The judiciary in most states has become a non-system tied together
at best by court rules that purport to create some uniformity of opera-
tion. What in fact exists are semi-autonomous operations with little
concern for the system at large.
Another authority says the administrative pinch exists because: "No
one is really in charge. . . . No one has the responsibility and au-
thority to see that the judicial department is operated efficiently for
the people."92 For Washington, that shoe fits, despite efforts to de-
velop an effective administrative system. The most notable legislative
efforts have been the creation of a Judicial Council in 192593 and the
creation of the office of Administrator for the Courts in 1957.94 Both
of these are good beginnings; neither has been developed to anything
approaching full utility. Progress also has been made by chief justices
who have, by exhortation and cajoling, elicited varying degrees of
cooperation. Nevertheless, the chief justice does not deal from a posi-
tion of strength, for his only express constitutional authority is to
"preside at all sessions of the supreme court." 95
It has already been shown that Washington's courts are not unified
in any meaningful sense. We have observed the adverse consequences
of this lack of unification upon the functions of finance and discipline,
but we have deferred until now the problems of management: how to
achieve greater efficiency, how to arrange adequate administrative
support, and how best to utilize judicial manpower.
There is room for debate as to what "efficiency" means when courts
are under discussion. One writer says that "Justice includes both speed
and fairness; it combines swift, efficient adjudication with a policy of
preserving due process . . ." and then, two pages later, observes
that "[d] ue process is inefficient, deliberately S0."'96 The author of the
foregoing statements is of course playing with the word "efficiency."
Nonetheless, we may be forced to decide whether to opt for volume
and speed because justice delayed is justice denied, or to "brook no
tampering with quality; [and handle lawsuits] lovingly and with care
92. Better Management ofthe Judicial System, 5 TRIAL JUDGES' J. 1,3 (Jan. 1966).
93. WASH. REV. CODE ch. 2.52 (Supp. 1972). Justice Robert C. Finley described the
operation of the Judicial Councils in The Bare Bones of Court Reform, 13 ST. Louis
U.L.J. 171 (1968).
94. WASH. REV. CODE ch. 2.56 (Supp. 1972).
95. WASH. CONST. art. IV, § 3.
96. Greene, Court Reform: What Purpose?, 58 A.B.A.J. 247. 248 and 250 (1972).
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irrespective of the effect on backlogs and trial delays. '97 Efficiency
must ultimately reconcile these demands and provide the most just,
the most accessible, and the most economical system attainable.
What is needed to achieve such a system? As a first step, S.J.R. 113
would place responsibility for the management and administration of
the judicial system in the supreme court, authorizing the court to
provide commissioners and other personnel pursuant to court rule.9 8
The chief justice would be the chief administrative officer, with super-
visory power over the entire judicial system.9 9 The structure delineated
by these new sections, charging the supreme court with administrative
policy and the chief justice with implementation of that policy, has
been advocated by the consensus statements of national and local con-
ferences' 00 and by the American Bar Association."0' If the role of the
chief justice is to be expanded as proposed, it is essential that he be
selected with this fact in mind. In this particular, S.J.R. 113 would
improve the existing provision for selecting the chief justice. 0 2 Vig-
orous administration and exercise of the disciplinary power might
make an effective chief unpopular with some colleagues and, indi-
rectly, with voters. If justices are to stand for popular election, the
chief should be protected from ballot-box retaliation for a job well
done. 03
97. fd. at 248.
98. SJ.R. 113 provides:
Section 17. MANAGEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION. The management
and administration of the courts shall be vested in the supreme court and shall in-
clude the power to provide for court commissioners and court personnel pursuant
to court rule unless the legislature, by a two-thirds vote, shall provide otherwise by
statute.
99. Id. § 15(3). This provision was not in the original joint resolution. It was added
as part of the Substitute Senate Joint Resolution. The sub-section provides:
(3) Administrative Role. The chief justice shall be the chief administrative officer
of the judicial system of the state of Washington and shall supervise and direct the
performance of the management and administrative duties of the judicial system
and shall preside at all sessions of the supreme court. The chief justice shall desig-
nate another member of the court to preside during such times as he may be absent
from sessions of the court.
100. 1971 Nat'l Conf. on the Judiciary, Consensus Statement, in JUSTICE IN THE
STATES 265 (F. Swindler ed. 1971); t972 Citizens' Committee on Washington Courts,
Conference Summary, Item 4(a).
101. ABA MODEL STATE JUDICIAL ARTICLE § 8, 2 (1962).
102. Section 15(l) of the proposed amendment calls for election of the chief by a
majority of the supreme court. The existing provision, WASH. CONST. art. IV, § 3, speci-
fies that the justice "having the shortest term to serve not holding his office by appoint-
ment or election to fill a vacancy" shall be chiefjustice.
103. As originally introduced, section 15(2) provided simply that "The term as chief
justice shall be established by statute or rule authorized by statute:' When the adminis-
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To discharge his proposed duties, the chief justice must administer
a system employing persons engaged in two different types of activity.
One group will hear and decide cases, performing the strict role of a
judge. The second group will do research, set calendars, arrange facil-
ities and provide kindred support services for the judges. By reason of
his own training, the chief justice will understand the work of the first
group but nothing in his professional education specially equips him
to supervise the work of the second group. Hence, persons with appro-
priate management skills-an administrator for the courts and his
staff-should be available to assist the chief justice with the second
function but should not be permitted to interfere with the first. The
administrative pattern should reflect this division of labor.
Judges' time is the most essential and expensive resource utilized in
the judicial system. To be minimally acceptable, an administrative
system must manage calendars,10 4 witnesses and juries,10 5 "lawyer
concentration," ' 0 6 and comparable "flow" problems in a way which
maximizes that resource. Beyond these obvious steps, what can be
done to obtain more judging per judge?
Evidence seems to indicate that not all judges are equally busy. If
case filings are a meaningful measure of work' 0 7 the discrepancy is
trative role of the chief justice was broadened (see notes 5-8 supra), the need for special
tenure was recognized; thus in the substitute resolution section 15(2) provides:
TENURE. The chief justice shall not be required to stand for reelection by the
electorate during his term as chief justice until the second general election follow-
ing the selection of his successor as chief justice, unless his term as chief justice
ends more than two years prior to the expiration of his regular term as a justice
of the supreme court.
104. An explanation of the "fantastic improvements" which can be made by care-
ful calendaring is offered by Clark, The Federal Judicial Center, 53 JUDICATURE 99
(1969).
105. Chief Justice Warren E. Burger, in Court Administrators-Where Would We
Find Them?, 53 JUDICATURE 108, 109 (1969), estimates an 80 percent waste of citizen
time and calls for improvement, while cautioning that "judge time" ought not be used
"to accomplish tasks that others with less training can do at less expense to the public.-
106. Former Justice Tom C. Clark has said: "Indeed, I dare say that the cause of
the backlog in most of our metropolitan courts today can be laid at the door of the
[legal] profession-either on the basis of inefficient operation, insufficient training.
concentration of cases in a few firms (especially in admiralty, patents, and antitrust),
or lawyers' insistence that they be permitted to control the litigation." Clark, Judicial
Reform: A Symposium, Introduction, 23 FLA. L. REV. 217, 219 (1971). Professor
Hans Zeisel, Court Delay and the Bar: A Rejoinder, 53 JUDICATURE I II (1969), denies
that there is evidence to support accusations that lawyer inefficiency and concentra-
tion are a cause of lost judge time.
107. There is danger in simply comparing the number of cases handled by judges.
Cases in one county may legitimately require, on the average, more time and resources
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significant, ranging from as few as 244 annual filings for the superior
court judge in one county to as many as 1,402 per judge in another
county.' 08 Such a variation in workload between judges suggests the
need for an effective "visiting judge" program or for a different geo-
graphical base for judicial districts.
The State of Washington does have a visiting judge program. 109
The Administrator for the Courts, who makes the arrangements, de-
scribes the program as a voluntary one and reports that in 1971 a
total of 1,020 days were served by superior court judges in judicial
districts other than their own. 110 Predictably, the program has en-
countered problems. Not all judges participate-882 of the 1,020
days were contributed by fifteen judges, the remaining seventy-seven
judges providing only 138 days. There is an inevitable loss of time in
travel-the 1,020 days gained cost 252 days lost in travel."' Another
"cost," difficult to assess, is the disadvantage of having disputes de-
cided by a visitor. There is some validity in the notion that a judge
should "have roots in the community if he is to grow in wisdom and
understanding of the problems peculiar to those who come before
him." 12 There is also a problem of "image" for the judge, especially
when he seeks re-election in his home area and feels obligated to ex-
plain his periods of absence.
Practical difficulties of this sort with the visiting judge program
have made another option, periodic redefinition of judicial districts,
attractive. The drafters of S.J.R. 113 undoubtedly had this in mind
when they provided that the Judicial Qualifications and Districting
Commission "shall biennially conduct a survey of the population and
workloads of various judicial districts and, if necessary, redraw the
than those of another county. For example, there may be a tendency to try complex
cases in metropolitan areas while more routine matters are handled by rural courts.
108. 1971 ADMINISTRATOR'S REPORT, supra note 23, at 75.
109. WASH. CONST. art. IV, § 7 provides that a superior court judge may visit in
any county at the request of the resident judge and "upon the request of the governor it
shall be his duty to do so." Legislation to implement the constitution has existed since
1890. See WASH. REV. CODE §§ 2.08.140,.150 (1959). In 1957, by enactment of WASH.
REV. CODE § 2.56.040 (1959), the legislature gave the chief justice of the supreme court
authority to direct such visitation and to condition issuance of salary warrants upon
compliance. WASH. REV. CODE § 3.34.140 (Supp. 1972) provides authority for a visiting
judge program among district courts but does not charge anyone with the duty of ar-
ranging for such visits. To visit, a judge must be invited, his county commissioners must
agree to his absence, and he must be willing to go.
110. 1971 ADMINISTRATOR'S REPORT at 101-02.
i11. Id.
112. McKenzie, Unification and Redistricting, in JUSTICE IN THE STATES 120 (F
Swindler ed. 1971).
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boundary lines .... ,"113 A persuasive argument for fewer and larger
districts as an alternative to essentially county-based courts has been
made by a Wisconsin study.114 Since Washington has already experi-
mented with multiple-county judicial districts, it should encounter
little difficulty in expanding the practice. 15
Voluntary programs provide further effective steps in the conserva-
tion of judicial time. A limited amount of circuit-riding by district
court judges is occurring in Washington 1 6 and an appreciable volume
of judging is being purchased by municipalities from district courts. 117
These efforts are illustrative, one hopes, of what will be accomplished
state-wide if a unified system is organized in which administrative re-
sponsibility is assigned.
B. An Administrator for the Courts
It is regrettable that the proposed Judicial Article would not consti-
tutionally provide for the office of Administrator for the Courts, as the
need for specialized, professional, administrative assistance in the op-
eration of the judicial system is now almost universally conceded. Of
course, the administrator should be responsible to the supreme court
or, perhaps better, to the chief justice, and it is appropriate that the
person should be appointed and dismissed by the supreme court. It is
the office, not the official, which should be constitutionally protected
from political anger or caprice.
113. S.J.R. 113, § 14 provides as follows:
DISCIPLINE AND REMOVAL. (1) Judicial Qualifications and Districting
Commissions. . . . The commission shall establish judicial districts within the
state and shall biennially conduct a survey of the population and workloads of the
various judicial districts and, if necessary, redraw the boundary lines of the districts
to conform to changes in population and workload found by its survey ....
114. Citizens' Study Comm. on Judicial Organization, supra note 35, at 75-76.
115. Washington has thirty-nine counties arranged, by legislative enactment, into
twenty-eight judicial districts. Nine districts have two counties, and one district is com-
posed of three counties, WASH. REV. CODE §§ 2.08.061-.065 (1959).
116. In Clark and Whatcom counties the district court judges travel to municipali-
ties on a fixed schedule. Court sessions accordingly are held on a limited but predeter-
mined number of days. The municipality provides the physical facility and pays a pro
rata share of the judge's salary.
117. 1971 ADMINISTRATOR'S REPORT at 21 indicates that fifty-eight municipalities
purchase judicial services. The payment in these arrangements is made by permitting the
district court to retain the filing fee. Revenue other than the filing fee is disbursed to the
municipality. One county audit shows that the cost of each case handled in 1969 under
this arrangement was $11.41 and that the county accordingly was subsidizing the munic-
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Existing legislation in Washington establishing the office of Admin-
istrator for the Courts is a good beginning. 18 The duties presently as-
signed to the administrator include gathering and evaluation of data,
budget development, assignment of judicial and support personnel,
and general examination of the clerical methods or systems being
used. The administrator also serves as secretary for the annual confer-
ence of judges of courts of record, undoubtedly a valuable contact.
The responsibilities assigned to the administrator are appropriate:
what his office lacks is structural legitimacy and authority. Implemen-
tation of the administrator's work ultimately depends upon his recom-
mendations to the chief justice and to the judicial council. The diffi-
culty with this arrangement is that the state supreme court and the
judicial council, as now structured, are themselves without express
administrative authority. The supreme court undoubtedly has some
sort of inherent supervisory power over the entire state judiciary.
However, until that managerial role is more clearly defined, the court
will be hesitant and on come occasions unwilling to act. Effort by the
administrator, accordingly, can be readily frustrated under the ex-
isting system.
C. The Legislature and Administration of the Courts
The advantages of good management and administration have been
recounted so frequently that to do it again is inappropriate. However
two specific items, both identified in House Concurrent Resolution
121,119 should be mentioned: (1) to what extent should the legislature
"determine some aspect of initiating or altering administrative prac-
tices and procedures utilized by the courts," and (2) what information
can be made available to enable the legislature "to adequately eval-
uate the need for additional judges . . ."?
The extent to which the legislature determines details of staff,
budget, and operation of the judiciary is truly remarkable in light of
the "separate and equal branches of government" theory. Discussing
the right of the judiciary to manage its own affairs, Dean Pound once
ipalities in the amount of $7.41 per case. KING COUNTY AUDITOR, REVIEW OF JUSTICE
COURT OPERATIONS I 1 (April 19, 1971). Cf. note 45 supra.
118. WASH. REV. CODE ch. 2.56(1959).
119. See note 2 supra.
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remarked that: "Even the pettiest state agency has much more control
than the average state court."'1 20 In Washington, the legislature versus
court contest has surfaced most clearly with respect to the
rule-making power. The rule-making power of the state supreme court
is conferred by statutory grant,12' not by the constitution. Concerning
procedural and administrative matters, it is clear that a court rule can
abrogate a prior statute.1 22 Apparently the court in this state has not
had to decide whether it has inherent rule-making power. 123
A glance at the proposed amendments to S.J.R. 113 demonstrates
how this tug-of-war is being continued. As originally drafted, for ex-
ample, section 1(2) provided that in addition to the supreme court,
court of appeals, and superior courts, other courts could be made
courts of record by statute or by rule authorized by statute. Section
1(4) originally provided that temporary assignment of judges could be
made pursuant to court rule or statute, and section 1(5) said that deci-
sions are to be documented as required by statute or rule. The pro-
posed amendments under consideration in the Senate Judiciary Com-
mittee would delete reference to the court rule in each of these in-
stances. Under the proposed amendments, even the court's power to
provide by rule for court personnel would be subject to reversal by a
statute adopted by a two-thirds vote of the legislature. Only the court's
power to adopt rules for "procedure of all courts," provided by sec-
tion 16, is without qualification.
Are these proposed limitations on the grant of rule-making power
simply an indication of legislative jealousy? Probably not. More likely
they reflect lack of confidence in the administrative capacity of the
judiciary, for the court historically has failed to demonstrate the ca-
pacity to manage its own affairs well. The self-perpetuating cycle im-
120. Quoted in Pringle, The Role of the State Chief Justice, in JUSTICE IN THE
STATES 82 (F. Swindler ed. 1971).
121. WASH. REV. CODE § 2.04.180- .190 (1959).
122. WASH. REV. CODE § 2.04.200 (1959): "Effect of rules upon statutes. When and
as the rules of courts herein authorized shall be promulgated all laws in conflict there-
with shall be and become of no further force or effect."
123. State v. Williams, 156 Wash. 6, 286 P. 65 (1930); State v. Pavelich. 150 Wash.
411, 273 P. 182 (1928); State ex rel. Foster-Wyman Lumber Co. v. Superior Court, 148
Wash. 1, 267 P. 770 (1928). In the Foster-Wyman decision the court said, in dicta, that
there was "excellent authority . . . that the making of rules governing procedure and
practice in courts is not at all a legislative, but a purely judicial, function." Id. at 4. 267
P. at 771. It continued, however, by saying that it need not, in the case before it, pursue
the "interesting . . . question . . . of legislative usurpation of judicial
powers . . . .. Id. at 5, 267 P. at 77 1.
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plicit in this reasoning can be broken only by assigning administrative
responsibility to the court and demanding effective use of the au-
thority conferred. To effectuate such a transfer, an effective adminis-
trator operating within a unified court structure is indispensable.
Solution of the second legislative concern-the generation of data
to be used by the legislature in determining when additional judges are
needed-also requires the existence of an effective administrator's
office. Judges' time is the most vital and costly resource in the judicial
system. The tendency is to measure success of the judiciaf operation
by the size of the case backlog and to assume that the only way to
reduce the backlog is to obtain more judges. Both these assumptions
are open to question. The number of cases waiting is not as important
as the time which will be required to process those cases,124 and "ex-
perience teaches that the omnibus creation of new judgeships has not
been the answer."'1 25 While the legislature has been reasonably gen-
erous in the creation of new judicial positions,126 whether these posi-
tions were justified and whether the "backlog" problem has been
ameliorated are fair questions. The most recent report of the Office of
the Administrator for the Courts states that:127
There is no means of accurately evaluating the quality of a decision
other than the crucible of time and the effect the opinion has had on
the development of the common law. Delay, however, can be precisely
determined and comparisons made.
The report then examines delay in appellate review, concluding that
there has been an improvement since establishment of the court of
appeals. What is missing is data concerning the far greater question of
performance of the trial courts. Data upon that significant issue are
either nonexistent or of virtually unusable quality. Courts in Wash-
ington have not yet entered the age of mechanized data retrieval.' 28
124. "Only two states (California and New York) transcend the single case as the
unit of delay measurement by translating delay into terms of predicted court time." The
Quality of State Judicial Statistics, 53 JUDICATURE 160, 161 (1969). Washington is just
beginning to develop information relating types of cases to time and expense.
125. Clark, Judicial Reform: A Symposium, Introduction, 23 FLA. L. REV. 217, 221
(1971).
126. Prior to 1971 there were eighty-eight superior court judges in Washington. The
number was increased to ninety-two by ch. 83 [1971] Wash. Laws, 1st Ex. Sess., and
to ninety-eight by S.S.B. 2227, 43d Wash. Legis., Ist Ex. Sess. (1973).
127. 1971 ADMINISTRATOR'S REPORT at 62-63.
128. The superior court administrators (there are now six in the state) and the
county clerks met on May I and 2, 1973, to discuss the possibility of developing data
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CONCLUSION
A new judicial article is needed. Whether it features a single trial/
single appeal or multiple appeal court structure is not as critical as the
fact that it be unified and that it be a system. Until that is accom-
plished, efforts toward efficient budgeting, discipline, and administra-
tion are doomed to remain makeshift add-ons to an obsolete,
turn-of-the-century mechanism, a situation in which good people are
seriously handicapped by a bad structure.
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retrieval capacity. It is the objective of the group to begin developing machine records
this year.
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